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ALD-251 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-1668
___________
JOHN K. YOUNG,
Appellant
v.
PHILADELPHIA COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY’S OFFICE; CITY OF
PHILADELPHIA
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 08-cv-03463)
District Judge: Honorable Berle M. Schiller
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
July 16, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, FUENTES and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(filed: August 11, 2009 )
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Inmate John K. Young appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his
pro se civil rights action.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
2In 1975, Young was tried for murder, burglary, and related charges.  At the trial,
the prosecution introduced evidence that the police had seized from Young’s home.  This
evidence consisted of a knife, shoes, pants, and a washcloth, all of which were stained
with human blood.  He was convicted and sentenced to a term of life imprisonment. 
After his conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal, Young unsuccessfully
pursued post-conviction relief in the state and federal courts.
In 2002, Young filed a motion in the Court of Common Pleas seeking DNA testing
of the evidence introduced at trial.  See 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann. § 9543.1.  That statute
allows prisoners access to post-conviction DNA testing; however, it requires, among
other things, that the prisoner claim actual innocence.  The Court of Common Pleas
denied his motion.  The Superior Court affirmed, noting that Young could not effectively
assert actual innocence because he had confessed to the crime prior to trial and because
there was an eyewitness who had positively identified him.  The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal in 2005.  
In 2006, Young sought permission to file a second habeas petition, this time
challenging the state’s denial of post-conviction DNA testing; we denied the request.  In
2007, Young again attempted to secure DNA testing, this time by filing a motion pursuant
to the federal Innocence Protection Act of 2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3600.  The District Court
denied the motion without reaching the merits because Young was convicted in state, not
3federal, court, but it suggested that Young might be able to pursue his claim in a civil
rights action.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Young next filed the present case, alleging that Pennsylvania’s refusal to permit
post-conviction DNA testing violated his right to due process and constituted cruel and
unusual punishment.  In addition, he claimed that Pennsylvania’s refusal to allow him to
assert actual innocence violated his rights under the Compulsory Process and
Confrontation Clauses.  The District Court dismissed the action as barred by
Pennsylvania’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations.  See 42 Pa. Con. Stat. Ann.
§ 5524; see also Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007) (noting that the length of the
statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim is governed by the personal injury tort law of the
state where the cause of action arose).  The District Court held that Young’s cause of
action accrued no later than 2002, when he first sought DNA testing in state court.  See
Sameric Corp. of Del., Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 142 F.3d 582, 599 (3d Cir. 1998).  
Young then filed a timely notice of appeal.  He argues that equitable tolling should
apply in his case because he had thought that he could only seek post-conviction DNA
testing through habeas proceedings.  In support of this argument, he notes the circuit split
over whether requests for post-conviction DNA testing are properly brought under § 1983
or in habeas proceedings.  We have not yet answered this question, nor need we do so
today.
      The absence of a federal constitutional right to post-conviction DNA evidence1
forecloses Young’s Eighth Amendment claim, which rested upon his due process
argument.  In addition, we need not address Young’s argument that equitable tolling
should have applied, as Osborne forecloses his claim, regardless of the statute of
limitations.  However, Pennsylvania’s strict policy toward tolling would likely bar
Young’s claim.  See Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 367 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that the
Pennsylvania statute of limitations may be tolled only for fraud or concealment).
4
The central claim in Young’s § 1983 complaint is that the Pennsylvania’s refusal
to allow post-conviction DNA testing violated his due process rights.  The Supreme Court
has recently rejected this argument.  See Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial
Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2323 (2009) (holding that there is no federal due
process right to access to DNA evidence).  1
Next, we consider Young’s argument that Pennsylvania impermissibly prevented
him from asserting actual innocence as required by state law.  In his pro se complaint,
Young fashioned this as a Sixth Amendment claim.  Reading the complaint liberally, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), we think that this claim is really a due
process argument, as it is an attack on the state procedure for post-conviction DNA
testing.  “[W]hen a State chooses to offer help to those seeking relief from convictions,
due process does not dictate the exact form such assistance must assume.”  Osborne, 129
S. Ct. at 2320 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987)).  In order for
Pennsylvania’s procedures to violate due process, they must offend, at a minimum, “some
principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people to be ranked
as fundamental,” or they must transgress a “recognized principle of fundamental fairness
in operation.”  Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446, 448 (1992).  We conclude that
Pennsylvania’s procedures for post-conviction relief do neither.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
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